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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN HARRISON, WIDOW OF 
WILLIAM G. HARRISON, DECEASED 
Plaintiff-Appellant, District Co·,,t No. 9-75-6507 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMcSSION OF 
UTAH, BILL G. HARRISON ~liNING 
COHPANY, and STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, 
Supreme Court No. 15401 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF T!IE CASE 
This matter represents an appo" ·.1 from an Indust:·ial 
Commission ruling which denied benefits to the widow of a miner 
who had made a claim pursuant to the occu~ational disease and 
disability laws of Utah. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Administrative Law Judge denied the claim of 
Joan Harrisol!, widow of William G. Harrison. A Notion to 
Review was filed with the Industrial Commission a.r:d the Corn:::.ission 
affirmed the decision of thE Adcr.in.istrative Law J•Jge. T!"le 
matter was brought before the St':7 :erne Court by Petitir_•_, for 
Writ of Review filed by Mrs. Harrison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent reque.ots the Supreme Court affirm the 
decislon of the Industrial Commission entered herein. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
William G. Harrison had been a uranium miner since 
1945. (R. 19-20). On August 29, 1975, he fij_ed an occupationa~ 
disease claim alleging disability as a result of silicosis ~d 
cancer caused by prolonged exposure tc; "rock dust and diesel 
smnke". (R. 1, 63). Before Mr. Harrison col!ld undergo med:;cal 
examinatio;, he died November 6, 1975. 
Mr. Harrison had been a smoker since th~ age of 
fou:::teen, at a rate of from one to on•' and one half packs per 
day. (R. 23, 33, 40). He was rated, medically, as a heavy 
smoker. (R. 41). 
The final diagnosis, given in an autopsy report 
(R. 60-62) states: 
1. CARCINOMIA, SM-'.LL CELL CARCINOMA, RIGHT 
UPPER LOBE WITH LYMPHATIC PERMEATION, 
RIGHT LOBE AI;D RIGHT LOWER LOBE (WHO 2B) 
2. PUk~ONARY FIBROSIS WITH EMPHYSEMA, 
MODERATE. 
3. SILICOTIC FOCI, ALL LOBES OF THE LUNG. 
4. PIJLMONARY EDEMA. 
5. REGIONAL LYMPH NODE METASTASIS, 
EXTENSIVE. 
d througho ,,t t!<e court's record, Other medical recor s, -
expand this analysis. (R. 70, 72, 76, 77) · 
of Mr. 
A medical panel was convened to review the records 
a 
report was submitted ~hlch concl~Jed as Harrison ar.d 
follows: 
-2-
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Percentage 
( l) Speci fie causes of death: 
a. 
b. 
Occupational Disease 
(if any) ..... . 
Name of occupational disease--
Probably Silicosis Grade I, (? 
early Gr<!de II), of itself nor_ 
disabling. 
othe·,- diseases ..... . 
Name of such diseases--Small 
cell lung carcinoma rig!1t upper 
lobe with regional metastases; 
and complications from cancer 
chemotherapy; and history of 
prolonged cigarette smoking; 
with chronic bronchitis and 
emphysema. 
c. Other contributing factors . 
Description of such factors--
It is recognized that the 
decedent did have relatively 
mild silicosis in degrr,e of 
itself, not disabling. 
TOTAL 
::.one 
100% 
100% 
The chairman of the panel was Dr. Elmer M. Kilpatrick. 
Dr. Kilpatrick testified that all of the panel mEmbers met as 
a group and reviewed the records of Mr. Harrison, (R. 133). 
FurtLer, tl;e entire panel agreed with the result. (R. 132). 
The panel's report was dated ~-lay 8, 1976. (R. 86) . 
On June 7, 1976, an objection to said report was filed by 
Mrs. Harrison alleging that Dr. Kilpatrick was "prejud1.ce and 
oiased and thereby unable to fairly evalu,;te claims invol,ring 
lung ca! cer allegedly from uranium m1.ning". 
-3-
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(R. 96) . 
A hearing on the oojec-r.ion was held January 26, l9:i 
At that t:.me Dr. Elmer M. i<ilpatri,~:- was called to 
testify in support of the panel's report. (R. 99) Dr. Vi etc: 
E. Archer was called~· behalf of Mrs. Harrison. (R. 112). 
letter addressed toR. S. Ferguson of the State Compensation 
Insurance Fund in Denver, Colorado, was admitted on Mot, (;n of 
Mrs. Harrison (R. 138-140) which aliegedly displayed th•~ bias:: 
Dr. Kilpatrick. 
Despite the allegations of the objection to the repc:: 
of the medical panel, no example of bias or prejudice, on the 
part of Dr. Kilpatrick, was offered other L~an the letter ~d 
testimony contained in the record. 
ARGUMEi·iT 
At the outset it should be understood that this :natte: I 
is, in reality, notl•ing more t:~an a conflict between the views 
of the two doctors who testified at the hearing. In f~i.ct, tJ·~e 
Objection to :-!edical Panel Repo:·_·t and to Medical Pan•' ~ is 
nothing- more thar, an object~on to Dr. Ki:.?atrick. 
is made to the o".her members of the ?·'nel, e•ren though th•o 
agreed wi-r.h the results contained in the report. 
In this ;:Togard, ::lr. Kilpat:-i:k ":esti::"isd t:"1at the 
· " · h d ~on~l~er~" aware of -:he ·..;ork done -::JY c-r ..... rc,er an ~ "'~ -~ 
i:: <:__je repor--:. • R. '-32-'..33) 
-4-
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POINT I 
THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS BASED ON 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDEi·iCE AND SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE AFFIRMED. 
The Supreme Cou::t ha.. often stated that w>ere there is 
any subs<~,;,;_tial evidence on the record to support the findings 
of the Industrial Commission, a reviewing court ca.,·,not do 
otherwise but affirm the judgment of the Co~mission. Amal-
gamated Sugar Co. v. !ndustrial Commission, 56 U. 80, 189 P.69, 
(1920) . 
When there is conflic': of material facts aJ'd competent 
evidence which might justify a finding either way, a finding 
oy the Commission will not be disturbed, and, in such cases, 
the cr•'dibility of witnesses and weight of evidence are 
questions of fact to be left to the Commission. Board of 
Education of Salt Lake Cil:y v. Industrial Commission, 83 U. 
256' 27 p .2d 805' (1933). 
The main issue in tJ;e case at bar was clearly stated 
by the Administrative Law Judge when he said: 
so it appears here that we have two diametri-
cally opposed opinions from very fLne medLcal 
doctors authorities in their field. Cross-
examination disclosed th.,• Dr. Kilpatrick 
gen•;rally held that cign:..ette smoking was the most 
common cause of the lung cancer c;,usLng death Ln 
cases where the deceased or disabled LndLV:.dual was 
a long-time cigarette smoker and that Dr. ctrcher 
on the other hand generally D>led that th~ cause of 
death was from cancer due to uranium exposure .. On 
cross-examination, Dr. Archer noted that there nad 
been very few cases, if any, out of some t•,.;enty 
-5-
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heard ,in Ut,_;h where he had tEstified differently 
th,m tJ•at h~s op~n~on was that the cause of death 
was uran~urn exposure. Dr. Archer acknowledged 
that there was a heavier incident of smoking 
among m~ners [ s~c ] among the gene·,·al population 
and tliat he CG•!ld only recall about one case out 
of twenty o~ thirty where a miner had died of 
carcinoma of the lung where the~e wasn't a 
history of smoking. The doctor further acknow-
ledged that recent studies convinced him tha'. 
the role of cigarette smoking is somewhat lctrger 
than he had originally thought. (R. 143) 
In appellant's brief it is said, at p.'>ge 4: 
Dr. Kilpatrick testified that in lung 
cancer cases, if there is a sh<~wing r:f 
,;rooking, he will ruJe aga:nst the appellcm: 
nc matter what othe~ facts exist, i.e., extent 
of exposure, type of cancer cells, or any other 
conceivable facts. (R. 138-140). 
No read.'L-;g of the record can f:_,,d such a dogmatic 
statem,,nt attributable to Dr. Kilpatrick. His testimony was 
rather different At R. 101 we read the following: 
(By Mr. Wilcox) Q It is your opinion is it not, 
Dr. Ki:patrick -- from what you have statEd in 
other hearings before this, on this matter of 
lung cancer in uranium miners -- t;,at if an 
Applic .... rt claims to ha·Te l unc; cc>.ncer caused by 
uranium employment, and is also a smoker, that 
you would in all cases of that type find no 
connection between the uranium mini~g and his 
cancer? 
(By Dr. Kilpatrick) A No, I wouldn't say that. 
I think that we'd have to still say that no one 
knows an exact single cause for cancer. 
Q All right. But isn't ~t a fact that 
in your opinion, if an App~icant_for lung-, 
cancer benefits is a smoker, as ra as you re 
concerned you're always going to ~ 1 d tnat t~e 
Applicant is not en~itled to bene~ ts? 
-o-
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. A_ I can't say it that dogmatically. The th~ng ~s that you have to recognize many other 
potential carcinogens. And, when you would 
s~ngle out smoking, that is not tr1ie. 
One need only read the letter which was admitted to 
evidence, on motion of Mrs. Harrison, to understand the 
position of Dr. Kilpatrick. In part it states: 
As far as Lung Cancer In Uranium Miners is 
concerned, I am aware that there is some increase 
in the incidence of this disorder in Uranium 
Miners, as compared to the general population. It 
may be that isotope exposure to uranium may be a 
co-carcinogen in the production of lung cancer, ~ut 
the consideration of this feature is so mixed up 
with other concurrent etiologies, that a dogmatic 
statement cannot be made with exact relationsh:~ps 
as to lung cancer being an exact result from radon 
exposure. It becomes apparent to me, and to the 
other members of the Medical Panel of Physicians, 
that in consideration of Uranium Induced lung 
Cancer, the issue becomes one of probability VS • 
improbability in the causal relationships. All 
other potential factors pertaining to etiology 
must be considered in the total analysis of any 
given case. 
In an attempt to up-date understanding in 
the matter of causal relationships to Uranium 
Exposure in Uranium Miners I have studied the 
literature on the subject; discussed it with 
oncologists, pathologists, cancer chemotherapists, 
x-ray Therapy experts, immunologists, and M~ne 
Safety Experts. The studies of Dr. Victor E. 
Archer, of the Nati.c.nal Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, Western Area Occupation,;l 
Laboratory, and h.Ls publicatins, influences 
the thinkir g of tl;e experts who say "yes'.' to 
the questions related to -- "Is a dogmat~c causal 
relationship between etiology of exposure to 
uranium in mines, in the production of lung 
cancer?''. 
It is not meant that the work of Dr. Archer be 
belittled. I am of the opinion that no other 
such study in the world can come up. to the . 
magnitude of the work done, for add~ng to tne 
-7-
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general knowledge related to production of 
lung .:::ancer. On the oth•; r hand, in the end 
analysis of a given lung cancer, in a Uranium 
M~ner, considering the multitude of variables 
concerning etiology, the end result rem;; ins that 
we do not knew for certain the nature of the cause 
and must say that "a co-carcinogen effect may exist 
from ~sotope exposure, but the present knowledge 
does not warrant a domat~c statemer:t that lt 
In the correspondence, pertaining to the three 
cases you referred to this office for review, 
(Bucher; N~cols; and Church), I find at the end 
of the letters of opinion from Dr. Archer, state-
ments to the effect: -- "The a!:>ove opinions with 
respect to the relationship of occupational and 
lung cancer in the case of (---------) are my own 
personal opinions, and are not tho',e of the 
Surgeon General or of the Public Health Service. 
In no way do I represent either in stating my 
attitude and opinions on tiL~s matter". I was 
surprised to see this statement in print. 
Furthermore there is no tag of identity in a given 
cancer from a Uranium miner. Cell types are the 
same, Uranium Mine.-,_., smoker, or in an idiopathic 
lung cancer. Also in considecing therapy for a 
Uranium Miner, there is no different specific 
treatment for this cancer categc-,ry. 
Certainly, in ai'Y given lung cancer, in a Uranium 
Miner, potentials for the effects in product:_c·n o: 
the cancer from isotopes must be considered, but not 
to the exclusion of all other potentials. Probabilit1· 
is to be differentiated from improbability .. and 
these words are the key to analysis. (R. 139-140) 
or. Archer himself testified that no do~matic state-
ments can be made with regard to causation of cancer. ( R. 118). 
If it is to be ruled thdt Dr. Kilpatrlck's opinion lS dogmatlc, 
it must be done by inference. If lnference is allowed to pl:lv 
such a role, then it must be remembered that Dr. Arcner 
-8-
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testified th,t he CGuld not remember any cases in Utah where 
he had testified that a cause of death was other than thE' 
result of uranium exposure. (R. 121). Certainly such test:.mony 
is inferential of a "dogmatic" view opposite to that attributed 
to Dr.Kilpatrick. 
At this juncture it should be obvious that, in the 
words cited.. supra, "we have two diametrically opposed opinions 
from very fine medical doctors". 
In po:c1.t of fact, this Court is not unaware of the 
dichotomy of opinion prevalent in th i ,,, case. Some of the 
same medical experts appeared in Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 
19 U. 2d 367, 431 P.2d 794, (1967). There, plaini: .. ffs urged that 
exposure to radon gas accounted for the higher average inc'cdence 
of lung cancer in ur;mium miners. The Industrial Commiss:: c:n 
disagreed and denied recovery to the widow and children 
(Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs garnered their evidence from, among 
other sources, Dr. Victor E. Archer. 
The Supreme Court, in upholding the Industrial 
Cornmission, said, at 371: 
The fallacy which underlies plaini. :~ ffs' 
attack on the Commission's findings is that 
they improperly attempt to fc,cus consideration 
of the issues exclusively upon thelr own vlew of 
the evidence and theories of tl;e case. Whlle 
somE aspects of the statistical data and medlcal 
theories harmonize with their cou~entlons, others 
-9-
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fail t0 do so. For instance, Dr. Saccomanno, 
the pathologist called by them, acknowledged 
the well known but unfortunate uncertainty 
as to the cause of cancer. He readily admitted 
that, in any given indiv~dual, "there are a 
great many unknown facto:cs as to what might 
cause cancer" and that " ... it could be 
concluded that the radon gas alone didn't 
cause the problem incident to the death, but 
it's merely based on a statistical study of a 
given number of cases." 
Consistent with the foregoing and corrz;.borating 
the existence of unknown factors and uncertainty 
as to causation, is thE· report of the medic:;~ 
panel to which this case was referred fc! 
reexamination: "We ca::-.not confirm that the lung 
carcinoma was caused by exposure to uranium 
mining occupatio~ •. " There is thus a reasonable 
basis in the evidence fo~ the refusal of the 
Commission to find in accordance with th<e 
plaintiffs' contention. Upon the principles 
states above it is our d•;ty to affirm the 
decision. [footnotes omitted] 
It is respectfully submitted, that the Industrial 
Commission had before it substantial evidence sufficient to 
sustain the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge when 
he said: 
The Administrative Law Judge after 
considering all of the evidence, testimony of . 
the parties ar:d the file herein anc.i furtLer notlng 
that three doctors made the lnvestlgatlon that led 
to the decision of the medical panel, finds that 
the deceased, Bill G. Harrison, did not die as 
the resu:.t of an occupational d',sease. 
POVIT II 
Tlil:: OPii\ION OF <·l.EDICAL EXPEJ'.TS DOES 'lOT ?.HOU:-./T TO 
BIAS OR PREJUDICE IN THE LEGAL SENSE. 
-10-
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AtJ<Jellant' s brief takes the position that the medical 
panel sits as judge of medical evidence. (<Jage 6) . The 
inference is moc<de that the decision of the <Janel is final with 
regard to medical evidence. The concJ us ion which appe llctr. t 
wishes to reach is that the "judge" in the instant case was 
11 biased. 11 
For reasons which will be discussed, infra, the 
ass1a. ptions made by appellant are very far from accurate. 
rlowever, accepting the position of appellant arguendo, 
does not help her. 
With regard to disqualification of a judge for bias 
or prejudice, such bias or prejudice must be for or against a 
party. 46 Am. Jur. 2d 198, §167, Judges, states, "The w0rds 
'oias' and 'prejudice' refer to the menta1 attidute or disposition 
of the judge toward a party to the li tigat:J··n, and not to any 
views that he may entertain regarding the subject matter 
involved". §168, 46 Am. Jur. 2d 200, adds, "Bias or prejudice 
does not refer to ai'Y views a judge may entertain toward 
the subject matter involved in th•" case" ... "The fact 
that a judge has strong feelings about the type of litig;;tion 
involved does not make him biased or prejudice"· 
It can be seen from the foregoing that "bias" ancl. 
"prejudice" are terms of art ·.vith a specifj_,. legal connotation 
·.vhich is more narro•,- than those terms convey in a popular sr,nse · 
-11-
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When thcs knowledge is applied to the "medical judge" 
in the present case, we see that Dr. Kilpa~rick may hold a 
particular view with regard to the subject matte.: of this case. 
His view would be that smoking was more prc,bably the cause of 
cancer than was exposure tu radon daughters. The subject matter 
would be the causation of lung cancer in uranium miners. Such 
a view cannot reasonably be construed to be a bias which would 
go toward a party. No suggestion has been m:tde th.;t Dr. Kilpatri~ 1 
had any feeling toward any of the claimants pe·c-sonally. In 
other words, no bias or pre" udice has been showr, which would 
be sufficient to disqualify Dr. Kilpatrick if he were actually 
sitting as a judge. 
POINT III 
OBJE CI'IUN TO COMPOSITION OF THE MEDICAL PANEL WAS 
NOT TH1ELY FI:LED. 
Continuing, arguendo, the acceptance of plaintiffs 
position as stated above, it is obvious th~t Dr. Kilpatrick's 
presence on th'= panel was apparent to appellants on Oci::der 
5 (R. 6) when a le~ter was sent to ~r. Harrison, before 10,197' 
his demise, indica~ing that the panel had been a~pointed by 
the Industrial commission anC. he was to a::pear befoie it. 
T!-lis 
is not a panel whose membership changes eacr, time i c considers a 
case. 
· · • me!TlD· ershl. :" thereon 'das a ·dell known Dr. KilpatrlcK s ,_, 
fact. The panel report was dated 1-lay 8, 1::176 · (R. 86). Frorn 
8 19 76, :10 ouJeCtl<•:1 to D:-. iC.l[Jatr~> October 10, 1975, to ~av ·, 
presence was forthcomlng. 
-12-
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Continuing the analogy of d:'..squalification of a 
judge, it is generally held that an appli•·ation for disqualif, cation 
must be filed at the earliest opportunity. This rule is mo>t 
strictly applied against a party who, having kn•.wledge of facts 
which might constitute grounds for disqualification, does not 
seek a disqualification until after an unfavorable ruling has 
been made. ReUnion Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, (1961); 
Cominetti v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 139 P. 2d 930, (1943); 
St<•te ex rel. Lefebvre v. Clifford, 118 P. 41, (1911). 
Ignoring the lack of bias in the legal sense, discussed 
above, it is obvious that appell<:.nt should have made the objection 
to Dr. Kilpatrick long be fore the medical p;lnel report was 
submitted. Appellant admits in her brief that Dr. Kilpatrick's 
views were kl~own to her. The letter which is used to establJ sh 
the allegat:.on was dated August 22, 1975. (R. 138). The case 
of Barney A. Statcup v. Atlas Minerals, et al, File No. 1Al286-
00-7, Case No. 1-73-2215, cited by appellant was heard by the 
Industrial Commission in Hay of 1975. 
Can, therefore, appellant contend that she did not 
knuw the position of Dr. Kilpatrj.ck until after the unfavorable 
medical report? Obviously, sucn a position is untenable and the 
objection should have been filed at an e,;rlier time· 
POUlT IV 
THE MEDICAL PANEL DOES NOT, IN FACT, SIT AS JUDGE OF 
c1EDIC:'>L ISSUES. THE PM<EL REPORT IS, PURSUANT TO §35-l-77, UCA, 
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1953, ONLY CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE IN THE CASE TO THE EXTE;~T IT 
IS SUPPO~TED BY TESTIMONY. 
Pursuant to §35-l-77, UCA, 1953, it has been held, 
in denying workmen's compensation benefits to a claimant, that 
the Industrial Cormnission did not err in considering the reFort 
of a medical panel along with other evidence. Such reports do 
not encroach upon the authority of th•? Con.mission to m.;.ke 
findings of fact and conclusions. Jensen v. U.S. Fuel Co., 18 
U. 2d 414, 424 P.2d 440, (1969). 
Relating back to Po!cnt I, supra, the panel report, the 
testimony of Dr. Kilpatrick, supported by other members of the 
panel, and that of Dr. Archer were all before the Commission to 
be weighed in arriv:.J•g at their decision. Each item was 
considered. The panel did not act as judge with regard to 
ultimate medical issues. Thf• Inclustrial Commiss ;, n so acts 
and appell.:.nt concedes this in her brief, at pa.,;e 7: 
Appellant recognizes and agrees that the 
report of the medical board is not cr,nclusi ve 
and is evidence to be considered by the 
Commission in arriving at a decision. 
The Garner case, supra, addresses thLs same issue when 
it says, at 19 U. 2d 370: 
Under our statutes and long established 
decisional law there are insuperable obstacles 
to the granting of tje relief sought by 
plaintiffs on this appe~l: 1t was thelr burden 
to shol•' affirmatively and to so persuade the 
commission that Mr. Garner's death resulted from 
a disease cau5ed by his occupat1on. It lS tne 
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prerogative of the Commission, ar.d n<,t of any 
medJ.cal pan•= I, to JUdge the cn•dJ.bJ.lJ.ty of the 
evJ.dence, and upon the basis of the whc;le 
evJ.dence to deternune the facts. The plaintiffs 
havJ.ng faJ.led to so persuade the Comrniss.'con, it 
is thr, duty of this court to survey the evidence 
J.n the lJght most favoranle to the findings and 
order; and we cannot reverse and compel an award 
unless the:-e is credible evide1'ce without sub-
stantial contradiction which points so clearly 
and persuasively in plaintiffs' favor that 
failure to so find must be regarded as cap-
ricious and arbitrary. Conversely, if there is 
any reasonable basis in the evidence, or from 
the l<tck of evidence, which wiJ 1 justify the 
refusal to so find, we must affirm. [footnotes 
omitted, emphasis added] 
Given all of the foregoing, it is obvious that the state-
ments in appellant's brief, with regard to an analog:: betw.~en 
the panel and judges, is co:o.pletely without foundation. The 
quotation'cited above also sustains the position of respondent 
taken in Point I of this brief. 
CONCLUSION 
In Summary, it is obvious that the Industrial Commission 
had before it all of tne available medical reports, opinions 
and ev~dence. Based on the record a choice was made by the 
Administr,.tive Law Judge and w.~.s sustained by the Commission· 
It is imt.ortant to note that neither of the two principle experts 
were as dogmatic in their view as alleged by appellant. 
conceded the relevancy of many factors with regard to 
causatio-, of cancer, including exposure to radon daughters 
and smokJ.ng. 
It is asserted th"' no bias existed in a legal 
sense. 
It is, furtl:er, asserted tr •. • t no bias tainted the 
exl..sted J.·n a lega: sense or in any othe• decJ.sion, whethe7 it 
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form. Appellant admits this fact implicitly when she states 
in her brief, at page 7, " 
. . In effect her medical claim 
has been examined by two impartial examiners and one very biased 
examiner It cannot logically be asserted that bias, 
even if it did exist, tainted the decision herein. Ar.y bias, 
legal or Othf~:;, is cleared when one admit.s that disinte:·.·ested, 
impartial examiners agn;ed wiU· the result. 
DATED and respectuJly submitted this day of 
January, 1978. 
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and to The Industrial Commission of Utah, 350 Ea:-t 500 South, 
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